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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

LARRY HOLLINGSWORTH
d/b/a THE KING'S PALACE &
RUSTY HANNA, et al.,
d/b/a THE SOCIETY OF
LICENSED MASSEURS,
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Case No. 16,831
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THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT
LAKE, a Municipal
Corporation, CLINT
BALMFORTH & THE SOUTH
:
SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT,:
Defendants and
,Respondents.

- - -0000000- - -

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
---0000000---

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The Appellants Appeal from a Judgment entered against them
.~n

the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, dismissing their

Complaint in this action, which Complaint seeks a Declaratory
Judgment that Sections. 3B-8-3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the revised ordinances
of South Salt Lake, 1974, as

a~ended,

brought pursuant to §78...;33·1 et seq.

are invalid, the action being
U.C~A.

(1953) as ·amerided.

Plaintiffs claim said ordinance sections are in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Article I; §2, 7 -,- and 18 and Article IV §1 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah; and various statutes of the State of
Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, with Judge Homer F.·
Wilkinson presiding, ordered Plaintiffs' Complaint Dismissed,
in a Brief Order of Dismissal, dated December 20, 1979.

This

Order of Dismissal was entered based on, and as a result of,
an earlier Memorandum decision, in the case of Redwood Gym .
et al, vs. Salt Lake County Commission et al, which Memorandum
decision declared a similar ordinance passed by the Salt Lake
County Connnission, to be valid in its entirety.

Judge Wilkinson

Dismissal was made pursuant to an agreement of the parties made
in an effort to expedite Appeal, after oral arguments had been
made on the continuation of a Restraining Order against the enforcement of the ordinance; and no proceedings have taken place
on the record.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the Order Dismissing their
Complaint, and the matter remanded to the Third Judicial Distric
Court with instructions to enter Judgment for Plaintiffs, declari
the above mentioned sections of th~ revised ordinances of the
City of void and of no effect.

In the alternative, Appellants

request this Court to remand this action to the Third Judicial
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs have been operating a Massage Business and
Health Studio at 6_0 East, 3300 South, in Salt Lake County,
since 1975.

On November 20, 1978, the Salt Lake County

Gommiss.ion passed an ordinance repealing Title XV, Chapter
18 of the revised ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as
amended, and enacting a new Title, XV Chapter 18 of the
revised ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended.
This ordinance purported to regulate the business of giving
massage~,and

contained provisions for the issuance of

licenses,determining whether the premises where massages
were given were sanitary enough for that purpose, prohibiting.
certain acts by masseurs, and leveling civil and penal sanctions
for violations of those proyisions.
action was filed by the owners

o~

On December 6, 197 6, at?-

several massage businesses

seeking a Declaratory' Judgment that Sections 3,4,5,7 and 8 of
the Massage Ordinance were invalid, and seeking injunctive
relief against the enforcement of those sections.

'A temporary

restraining .order was issued against the enforcement of the
ordinance as a whole, but was subsequently limited to sections
S (1) and 5 (2) of the ordinance,

proh~biting

the County from

enforcing only those sections having to do with the proscription
of opposite sex massages and the consumption or storage of alcoholic:
beverages on the premises.

This limiting of the restraining order
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was by mutual agreement, as it was determined by both
parties that this would be adequate to allow the businesses to
continue functioning while the legal process determined the
validity of the ordinance.

On December 14, 1979, that case,

Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County Commission, was decided by
the Third Judicial District Court, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
presiding, in a short Memorandum decision pursuant to Motions
for Summary Judgment made by both the business owners and the
County.

The Memorandum decision simply stated "Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
for Summary Judgment is granted."

Defendant's Motion

It then indicated that the

Restraining Order would be set aside at 5:00 P.M. on December
19.

An appeal of that decision was made shortly thereafter,

and is now pending before this Court.
The Plaintiffs in this action, while in similar circumstanc
to the Plaintiff's in the other action, did not become parties

thereto, one reason being that the City of South Salt Lake was,
at that time, invo 1ved in annexation proceedings to remove their
business from the jurisdiction of the County.

Early in 1979,

the annexation was completed, and on March 14, 1979, an ordinanc
was passed by the South Salt Lake City Couno±.1 duplicating.the
County ordinance, with only minor changes to allow for proper
administration by the City, as opposed to the County.

An oral

agreement was tentatively made between the owners of several
massage businesses now in the City of South Salt Lake , and the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

authorities of that City, that the one section of the ordinance
having to do with opposite sex massages would not be enforced
until a decision was-rendered in the Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake
County Commission case, thus allowing the businesses in South
Salt Lake to remain open, as long as they abided by the rest
of the

ordinance~

Late in 1979, that agreement broke down

amidst charges of Police Harrassment, by the business owners,
and Countercharges of wide spread violations of other sections
of the ordinance, by.the City.

During October and November of

1979, six arrests were made of masseurs working in the business
operated by Plaintiffs for violations of §5 (3) of the South Salt
Lake ordinance, ·which prohibits the touching of the genitals
of a customer by a masseur, and offering to·touch.

A review

of the action brought by those massage business owners still
operating in the County, showed that they had backed away from
any challenge

t~

that specific section of the County ordinance,

and it was deemed necessary to make such a challenge immediately,
in connection with the challenge made to the other portions of
the City ordinance.
This action was filed on December 10, 1979, and a temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of the contested
sections of the City ordinance was issued that day;

The Order

to Show Cause why that temporary restraining order should not be
made a preliminary injunction was set for hearing on December
18.

At the Hearing on December 18, it was announced by Judge
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Horner F. Wilkinson that a decision had been reached on the related County law suit, and that a summary judgment had been
granted to Salt Lake County, allowing them to enforce the contested portions of their massage ordinance.

Argument was made

at the time on the additional issues- presented by the instant
case. Judge Wilkinson indicated that it was his feeling that
there were no substantial differences in the law-suits,
he was inclined to stand by his decision that the entire
was valid.

He indicated further that he would allow the temper

restraining order to remain in effect for the rest of the ten
day period allowed such an order, and then allow it to dissolve
by its own terms.

Since such a decision meant that the City

would shortly be allowed to enforce the entire ordinance, and
since the City indicated that it intended to do so, Plaintiffs
agreed to treat the oral arguments on the hearing for temporary
relief as cross moticn.s for summary judgment, thus allowing a
Judgment to be entered, which could promptly be appealed.

Ther

-fore no proceedings were had on the record in this case, which
was dismissed on December 20.

An appeal was filed on ·December

21, and this Court issued its own temporary injunction against
the enforcement of the opposite sex provisions of the same
ordinance du~ same day.

Further argument on the continuation of

such injunction was set for, and made, January 7, at which time
Court issued a further injunction against the enforcement of
that provision of 'the ordinance, pending the outcome of this
case.
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The contested sections of the ordinance are fully set out
below:
Sec. 3B-8-3. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF· A LICENSE.
Each individual desiring a massage establishirient license
or masseur license shall:
(1)
(2)

Be an individual of at least 21 years of age.
Make application to the City Council through
the City Recorder for a business license and
provide the following material and information
under oath:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(3)

·The street~ building, and room number
of the place where applicant proposes
to give massages or maintaina massage
establishment.
Make written dosclosures of all convictions
of crimes involving moral turpitude within
the past 5 years.
·
Two duplicate photographs of the applicant,
measuring two inches by two inches, that
have been taken within one month from the
date of the application.

A certificate from a licensed physician certifying
that the applicant is free ~rotn conununicable
diseases.

Sec. 3B-8-4. SANITARY PREMISES, All applications for a
massage establishment licertse shall be referred to the Salt
Lake City Board of Health for investigation and a license
shall be granted only after a finding by the Salt Lake
City-County Board of Health that the proposed premises
are sanitary enough to conduct business therein without
jeopardizing the public health.
Sec. 3B-8-5.
prohibited:
(1)

PROHIBITED ACTS. The following acts are

It shall be unlawful for a masseur to administer,
for hire, to any person of the opposite sex, a
massage, a fomentation, or a bath. It shall be
unlawful for any massage establishment licensee
to cause or permit in or about his place of
business or in connection with his business,
an employee to administer a massage upon any
person of the opposite sex. This section shall
·not apply to any treatment administered by any
person licensed to practice a healing art or
profession under the provisions of Utah Code
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Annotated, 1953, or of any other law of this
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(2)

(3)

It shall be unlawful to serve, to store, or
allow to be served or allow to be consumed,
any alcoholic beve~ages on the licensed premises of a massage establishment.
It shall be unlawful for a masseur to touch
or offer to touch or massage the genitalia of
customers.

Sec. 3B-8-7. CIVIL SANCTIONS. Any unlawful conduct,
whether the omission to perform an act required by this
ordinance, or the performance of an act prohibited by
this ordinance, shall be cause for revocation or suspension of a massage establislun.ent's license or masseur's
license. The holder of a massage establishment license
may have his or her license revoked or suspended for any
and all violations of the provisions of this ordinance
conunitted by his or her employees.
Sec. 3B-8-8. PENALTIES. The person convicted of violations of this chapter of the Revised Ordinances of South
Salt Lake may be fined not to exceed $299.00, imprisoned
in the Salt Lake County Jail not to exceed six months,
or both.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
§5(1) OF THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS VOID
AS BEING AN IMPROPER EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER.
This section prohibits a masseur from massaging a person
of the opposite sex, and also prohibits the owner of a massage
establishment from allowing such conduct.

It has been agreed

by all parties that most massage buslness is by women on men,
and that this ordinance would eliminate that business.

Since

the ordinance in question here is basically identical to the
County ordinance passed four months earlier, it is useful to
look at the minutes of the Public Hearing held by the Board
of Commissioners of Salt Lake County on November 20, 1978,
-8-
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before passing their ordinance.

The Memorandum filed by the

Salt Lake County Attorney in the Lower Court Proceeding on
the Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County Commission c·ase shows
clearly the reasoning behind the ordinance:
The major advocates for the adoption of the ordinance
were Mr. Curtis Oberhansly, Chief Deputy County
Attorney and Mr. Nick Morgan, a Captain over the
Vice Squad for many years in the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office. They each testified that the
circu..~stances in the unincorpor~ted area of Salt
Lake County required the adoption of the ordinance.
Mr. Oberhansly testified that in many cases massage
parlors are fronts for prostitution and that during
the preceding six years the Salt Lake County Sheriff
has tried to control prostit~tion in massage parlors
by enforcing existing state la.ws, by enacting and
enforcing new county ordinances and by enforcing
other laws, but it has been ineffective. Defendant's
~emorandum, page 3.
·
Quoting from the official Minutes of the Hearing, the
County Attorney quotes Mr. Morgan as stating the frustrations·
of his Office in combatting the problem:
Rarely is the jail sentence imposed. The fine is of
such a nature that it could be classified as th~ cost
of· doing business. You talk about prostitution and the
type of money that is generated from that type of
activity. The fines that are levied in regards to
the misdemeanor violations are a mere pittance in
comparison to what is made, so could adequately be
classified as a cost of doing business. So obviously
the State Law and the situation related to massage
parlors specifically is not adequate because it allows
a bridge or a situation that takes much more time as
far as an investigation is concerned that is justified
by the outcome as evidenced by the tremendous growth
in massage parlors merely. in the last six months.
This is not the first attempt on the part of Salt Lake
County to combat the problems of prostitution by eliminating
or severly restricting massage parlors.

-9-

In the case of
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Jensen vs. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 530 P2d.
3 (Utah 1974), this Court dealt with a Salt Lake County
Ordinance which required that masseurs or massage parlor
operators must have practised as massage therapists for at
least five years, be graduates of a massage and/or therapy
school approved by the American Massage and Therapy
Association, or be a fully accredited member of that association.

The Court, in finding the ordinance invalid, stated:
At the Trial in the court below a county commissioner
and a member of the county sheriff's office testified
that prostitution was the major concern in the adoption
of the ordinance in question. It is the County's
contention that it is a valid exercise of police power
to regulate massage establishments and-to control
prostitution. We are of the opinion that the County
does have the power to deal with those matters directly.
However, the Ordinance unde~ consideration does neither,
but rather it attempts to set standards and qualifications
of those persons who intend to engage in a legitimate
occupation or trade. This is not a proper exercise of
the police power. At page 4.
The decision arrived at in that case was unanimous, and

the opinion was joined in by four of the five Justices of this
Court.

Justic~

Ellett, concurring in the result, stated:

I concur in the result. The
in my opinion are too severe
requirement for a license to
surely are masseuses who are

requirements of the ordinance
to be considered a reasonable
operate as a masseuse. There
moral women. At page 4.

Apparently not convinced that this Court would not
approve an ordinance directed at prostitution, but penalizing
those not engaged in prostitution who are attempting to engage
in a legitimate business, Salt Lake County passed a further
ordinance requiring large licensing fees and attempting to
establish classes of massage operators "intended to make
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a distinction between theraputic massages and 'pleasure-type'
massages."

Hart Health Studio vs. Salt Lake County, 577 P2d.

116 (Utah 1978), at 119 . . While the Court invalidated this
ordinance on the basis that the·classes were arbitrary and
unreasonable, the Court made some comments which are very
much on point in the instant case.

§15-18-3 of the Salt Lake

County Ordinance, at that time, read, in part, .as follows:
Effective January 1, 1977, the following annual license
fees shall be charged:
(e) for any massage parlor employing any of the
masseurs who worked at any massage parlor business
whose massage parlor license had been revoked within
the past twelve months., by the Board of County
Connnissioners: $5,000.00. At page 117.
The Court, in addressing this section. of the ordinance,
stated as follows:
§15-18-3 (e) imposes an annual license fee of $5,000
on a licensee, whose annual fee but for this section
would be $250.
The imposition of this $5,000 license fee is related
neither to the violation of a coµnty ordinance by the
licensee who must pay the fee, nor to a violation by
the employee -- masseur but.instead> is based on a
violation of an ordinance by a form:er. employer of the
employee. This class of employees and employers is
discriminated against and without reasonable relationship
to eliminating immorality.
We also believe this section of the ·ordinance is somewhat like the old bills of pains and penalties (special
acts of a legislature which inflict punis·hment on
persons without any conviction by the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings), prohibited by the Utah and
U.S. Constitutions. The Ordinance clearly penalizes
the masseur and .his employer without a trial or conviction, and thus is clearly invalid and unenforceable
under the constitutional provisions cited. At 118.
Amont the other sections of the ordinance struck down by
-11-
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this decision, were sections dealing with the posting of a
performance or cash bond by any massage parlor intending to
allow massage of the opposite sex, in order that the massage
parlor would, by so doing, guarantee its compliance with the
general laws of the county.

The Court did not reach the

contention of the massage parlor owner that this was an invalic
use of the police power, but instead ruled that the classificatj
scheme of which it was a part, was illegal, and so the ordinanc
could not stand.

Plaintiffs contend, however, that the oppo-

site sex provisions of the new ordinance is as was the previous
part already cited, "somewhat like the old bills of pains and
penal ties~' prohibited by both the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, §2 of the Constitution of Utah.

Section 15-8-6(3), standing by itself, is very

similar to the present §3B-8-5(1) which is contested here, but
is not as harsh.

While that section would have allowed-a

massage parlor to stay in business, although at some

inconv~n

ience, this present ordinance is assured of putting most, if
not all, massage operations out of business.
Both the county and the city do have power to regulate
businesses in their jurisdictions, although §17-5-27 U.C.A.

(1953) appears to be broader in giving grants of authority
to counties than is §10-8-39 U.C.A. (1953) in giving such
grants to cities.

The ability to license and regulate,

however, does not include the ability to prohibit.

(See
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Combined Communications Corporation vs. City and County of
Denver, 542 P2d. 79 (Colo. 1975)). Nor does it, of course,
unreasonabl~

include the right to make

and arbitrary regula-

tions, as can be easily seen by the two Utah cases previously
cited (see also Winther vs. Village of Weippe, 430 P2d. 689
(Idaho 1967)).

The city and county ordinances at issue in the

two cases under advisement here come before this court as the
result of a simple inability on the part of the county commission:. and city council to believe_what the court has told them
clearly twice before:

You must not punish someone for what they

might do, and if you desire to stop prostitution, stop it
directly, not by pro hi bi ting businesses in whi_ch ·the opportunity
for such acts might present itself, if the business operator is
unscrupulus.
POINT II
§3B-8-5(1) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH SALT LAKE
IS INVALID AS EXCEEDING THE DELEGATED AUTHORITY

~!VEN

TO

CITIES BY THE LEGISLATURE.
This Court, of course, has ruled in Salt Lake City vs.
Sutter, 61 U. 533, 216 P. 234 (Utah 1923) that all powers of
municipalities are derived from the legislature.

Those powers

and duties are found in Title 10 Chapter 8 U.C.A. (1953) as
amended.

§10-8-41 U.C.A. states that cities:

. may suppress and prohibit the keeping of disorderly
houses, houses of ill fame or assignation, or houses
kept by, maintained for, or resorted to or used by,
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one or more persons for acts of perversion, lewdness
or prostitution within the limits of the city and
within three miles of the outer boundar"ies thereof,
and may prohibit resorting thereto for any of the
purposes aforesaid; they may also make it unlawful
for any person to commit or offer or agree to commit
an act of sexual intercourse for hire, lewdness or
moral perversion within the city, or for any person
to secure, induce, procure, offer or transport to
any place within the city any person for the purpose
of committing an act of sexual intercourse for hire,
lewdness or moral perversion, or for any person to
receive or offer or agree to receive o~ direct any
person into any place or building within the city
for the purpose of committing an act of sexual
intercourse for hire, lewdness or moral perversion, or
for any person to aid, abet or participate in the
commission of any of the foregoing; and they may
also suppress and prohibit gambling houses and ,
gambling, lotteries and all fraudulent devises and
practices, and all kinds of gaming, playing at dice
or cards, and other games of chance, and the sale,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or lewd publications, prints, pictures or illustrations.
§10-8-51 gives the City further powers in the area of
prostitution, as follows:
They may provide for the punishment of tramps, street
beggars, prostitutes, habitual disturbers of the peace,
pickpockets, gamblers and thieves, or persons who
practice any.game, trick or devi.ce with intent to
swindle.
As stated by this Court in the Jensen case previously
cited, the City is not without power to directly prohibit
and punish prostitution or lewd and perverse conduct in fact,
if it can be shown that all massage establishments are "disorderly houses or houses of ill fame" or are "kept by, maintained for, or resorted to or used by, one or more persons
for acts of perversion, lewdness or prostitution," they may
in fact prohibit them.

That, of course, the city cannot do.
-14-
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What the city can do, however, is prohibit, by the withdrawal
<?f business iicense, those specific massage establis·hm.ents
which are used for illegal purposes.

In fact, both the city

and the county have successfully terminated business licenses
of massage parlors where there has been illegal- conduct, while
these actions have been proceeding.

The City of South Salt

Lake has terminated two· business licenses, and .is in._the process of terminating at least one more, pursuant to the rights
of Due Process guaranteed the operators by the State and Federal Constitutions.

Allowing the city to simply prohibit

this type of business because of what might happen, short
circuits the entire Due Process guarantee and just assumes
that anyone involved in that kind of business must be doing
something improper, and.should be sup.pressed.

Plaintiffs

realize that allowiµg the City to do this would make things
easy for city authorities,'but basic rights of the people
may not be abridged for the sake of convenience of the ·
governing authority.
In addition to· the two statutes cited, the city claims
authority for this ordinance under §10-8-84 U.C.A. (1953).
This statute states:
They may pass all ordinances and' rules, and make
all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary
for carrying into effect or di: ~oha.rrg'ing all powers
and duties conferred by this chapter, and such
as are necessary and proper to provide for the
safety and preserve the health, and promote the
prosperity, ~mprove the morals, peace and good
1

-15-
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order, comfort and convenience of the city and
the inhabitants thereof and for the protection
of property therein; and may enforce obedien~e
to such ordinances with such fines or penalties
as they may deem proper; provided, ·that the
punishment of any offense shall be by fine in
any sum less than $300.00 or by imprisonment
not to exceed six months, or by both such fine
and imprisonment.
These same three statutes were ci.ted by the City of Salt
Lake as authority for passing the ordinance at issue in the
case of Salt Lake City vs. Allred, 19 Utah 2d. 254, 430 P2d.
371 (Utah 1967).

Defendant in that case was convicted of vio-

lation of a city ordinance of "aiding and abetting in the commis
sion of a crime in that the Defendant directed a police officer
to a certain apartment to obtain sexual intercourse for hire."
At 372.
There as here, the ordinance was attacked as being beyond
the power of the city, under the grant of authority given them
by the legislature.

The Court, in answer to that question, and

specifically referring to the three statutes already cited by
Plaintiffs stated:
It will be noted that the first two of the statutes
above referred to deal with prostitution. While the
ordinance we are considering contains no definitions
of the terms used therein, nevertheless, it is quite
evident that the ordinance was not designed to deal with
prostitution. The generally accepted definition of
prostitution is a practice of a female offering her
body to indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men.
The ordinance in question g~e~ beyond the grant of power
by the legislature to the cities to suppress prostitution. · 430 P2d at 372.
Further, the Court stated that:
-16-
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It is elementary that municipalities are limited
by express grants of power from the legislature
or as necessarily implied from such grants. It
appears that the ordinance we have under consideration goes beyond the grant that any legislative
authority granted to the city and is therefore
invalid. At 373.
The Court held for the Defendant, the person convicted
for violating.the ordinance, but later reversed. itself, on
a petition for re-hearing, (20 Utah 2d 298, 434 P2d (Utah
1968)) when one Justice disqualified himself, allowing a
District Court Judge to sit, and tip the balance of power
in the other direction.

The Court appeared then to change

it's mind on the constrµction of

§10~8-84,

it gave the City much wider power than
by §10-8-41, and §10-8-51.

and state that

thos~

powers given

·Judge Cowley, now speaking for

the Court, stated:
It is a well settled rule that it is a proper exercise
of the police power ·as set forth in the above statute
to preserve and protect public morals, and any practice
of business which has a tendancy to weaken or corrupt
the morals of those who follow it, as shown by experience, is such conduct as affects the public morals.
434 P2d at 435.
We are of the opinion that the general police power is
a sufficient grant of authority .to authorize the city
ordinance involved in this case unless 'prohibited by
statute or inconsistent therewith.' at 436.
This language, of course, . must be viewed somewhat
cautious~y,

as it was done in a sharply divided case, with

a District Court Judge deciding the balance of power, and was
decided well before the Jensen and Hart massage cases.

In
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addition, the Court relied in it's decision in Allred, on the
absence of conflict between the state statute and the city
ordinance, and the harmony between them.

Not only is there

no such harmony in this case, but that portion of the second

-·

.

Allred decision dealing with conflict between state statutes
and city ordinances has been cut back substantially by
subsequent Court decisions which will be dealt with later
in this Brief.

In addition, there are observations in the

dissents of the two Justices who had previously been in the
majority, worth presenting.

Justice Tuckett stated:

I dissent. After carefully considering ·the main
opinion and the legal problems raised by this
Appeal, I am constrained to adhere to the position
taken in the prior opinion of the Court. I do not
agree that the general grant of police power to
the cities by §10-8-84, U.C.A. (1953), was intended
by the legislature to authorize adoption of the
ordinance we are here concerned with. It would
seem that had the legislature intended such broad
powers it would not have made specific grants of
power to cities to deal with certain aspects of
prostitution as provided for by §10-8-41 and §10-8-51,
U.C.A. (1953). The latter statutes would be
unnecessary and superfluous. At 438.
Justice Henriod, supporting Justice Tuckett, stated:
The two dissenters in the former case cast their
lot entirely under Title 10-8-41, U.C.A. (1953).
The author of the opinion in the present case pays
no attention to those votes, but bases his conclusion entireli on Title lG-8-84, U.C.A. (1953), and
does not assign 10-8-41 as a basis for his conclusion.
It would seem to me that this new departure amounts
to a dissent from the dissenters. Under such circumstances it appears to be sort of an affirmance
not reversal of the former case. At 438. ·
'
In the former case Mr. Justice Tuckett simply said
what every lawyer should know, that cities cannot
-18-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

exercise powers _not delegated.to them by the state
or its Constitution. Each Justice soundly and
fundamentally said that the subject Ordinance
(32-1-1) was an attempt to exercise a power not
so delegated. At 439,
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that §10-8-84 does
indeed g_ive additional wide powers to the city to do such
things as "are necessary and prop·er. to provide for. the safety
and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort and convenience of the City and the
inhabitants t_hereof,

" We are still back where we started.

This is still not an ordinance necessary or proper in the
fight against prostitution.

It does not deal with prostitu-

tion directly, but deals with it in an indirect manner, which.
the Court, in Jensen, clearly said cannot be done.

This case

is not analogous to the Allred case, where simp.ly another
aspect of the

pros~itut:Lon

business was prohibited.

·A case involving many of the same issues as are present

·here was before this Court in the case of Salt Lake City vs.
Revene, 124 P2d 537. (Utah 1942).

In that case, the Defendant

was charged.with theviolation of a city ordit).ance regulating
the hours in which a barbershop could ·remain open.

Defendant

demurred to the charge, and both the trial court and Supreme
Court sustained that demurrer.

The city argued that the

regulation of hours of the business was "valid under the police
power granted it by the legislature by §15-8-39, 15-8-84, and
15-8-61 . . . "at 538.

The statutes cited, under the code of

1933, were the same statutes now designated as §10-8-39, 10-8-84,
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•

and 10-8-61.

Section 10-8-39 is the general licens.e and tax-

ing authority, and

10~8-61

allows the city to make regulations

to "prevent the introduction of contagious, infectious or maH
nant diseases into the City.

"

Section 10-8-84, of course,

is the general statement which has been previously discussed.
The Court unanimously turned down the

city'~

position, which

the Court characterized as follows:
It is Plaintiff's position that the above ordinance
regulating the hours of a barber shop is a valid
exercise of the police power delegated by the legislature to the city to ''regulate" for the safety
and preservation of health of the community. The
Plai~tiff introduced evidence taken at a previous
time in the form of testimony by barbers and health
officials to the effect that a "tired barber was a
negligent barber", tending to afford an opportunity
for the spread of diseases associated with the
profession. Further, that from an administrative
standpoint it was impossible to inspect the barber
shop after 6 o'clock P.M. at 538.
The Court then discussed this contention, as follows:
It has been repeatedly stated by 1;his Court "That a
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise
the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessary
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted; third, those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes
of the corporation, -- not simply convenient but
indispensable." (citations omitted) at 538.
The rule making power given to cities in reference
to barber shops does not mean any rule but such
rules reasonably related and designed to protect
the health of the public. at 539.
A tired barber may be a careless barber but it
does not follow that all shops which remain open
more than a certain number of hours engage the
same barbers throughout the entire period. Barbers
can work in shifts. If the object of the law was
-20-
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to prevent barbers from getting tired the simple
way would have been for the legislature to have
given power to regulate the working hours of
barbers in shops rather than the hours of barbershops. If limiting the hours of barbers is
encompassed within the phrase "regulate barbershops" the city would need no other power from .
the legislature than it now has to do that. If
the purpose of the ordinance was to limit the.
working hours of the operators, granted that
could be done, the method was too indirect and
accomplished far wider results than mere limitation of working hours. (citations omitted) at 539.
The argument that limiting the hours of barbershops
tend to cut down the number of hours they must be
policed and thus is a reasonable administrative
measure to aid in their regulation, is more tenable.
It would seem that all establishments where human
beings must repair fo~ work to be done on their
person might require frequen.t inspection to see
·that they were kept clean and neat. Section 35-1-13,
R~S.E., 1933~ evidently had such inspections in_
mind "during business hours." Naturally if business
hours could be limited to fixed hours it would,
in time, cut down the hours not only when they could
be inspected but the period during which a proper
, standard of cleanliness must be maintained therein
and consequently the periods when the inspectors
would be required to keep them up to standard. The
fact that actually there was only infrequent inspection of barbershops cannot itself affect the
fact that ordinarily the less hours a place need be
policed the less onerous are the.duties of policing.
Be that as it may, the cases seem to be universally
against the contention that limiting hours -comes
within a power to regulate.for the purpose.of
protecting the health of the public. at 539 ..
The Court then goes on to cite several cases where hour.
limitations had been turned down as beyond. the power of municipal corporation.

The power which the City of South Salt

Lake attempts to exercise over the business operated by
Plaintiffs, is far in excess of the power attempted to be
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used by Salt Lake City, in the cited case.

In both instances,

the City has attempted to make its own regulation and police
job easier, by severely restricting the business that can be
conducted.

In neither case is the convenience of the city

an important enough consideration to allow them to exercise
that kind of power.

In both cases, the attempted regulation

is far wider in scope than is necessary or proper to achieve
the valid protection of society, at which the law is aimed.
In neither case does the city have the power they have
attempted to exercise.
therefore be told by

The City of South Salt Lake should

thi~

Court

t~

once.again attempt to

achieve reasonable regulations designed to directly achieve
a goal which the city may achieve, under its limited powers.

POINT III
. SECTION 3B-8-5(1) IS INVALID AS BEING IN CONFLICT WITH
THE GENERAL STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
As has been previously noted, the county has openly
admitted that its· ordinance is an attempt to regulate sexual
behavior, and specifically prostitution.

The city, not having

been called upon by the lower court to present any evidence
at all, but having adopted the county ordinance in its entirety
can only be assumed to be concerned about the same thing.

In

fact, the Supreme Court of California, in Lancaster vs. Municipal Court for the Beverly Hills Judicial District of Los
Angeles County, 494 P2d. 681 (Calif. 1972) found that that was
the only reason for a similar ordinance passed by the City
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of Los Angeles:
There has been-no suggestion of any reasonable
purpose to the ordinance before us other than to
limit sexual activity. Although it has been·
urged that the ordinance should be viewed as a
regulation of business of administering massages
and not a sexual regulation, the only specification
of any actual or potential evil is the sexual
activity which may follow in the wake of the
massage. at 683.
·
. . . the purpose·of the ordinance in question was
not to regulate ~the operation of massage parlors
but was aimed at making the task of the police
department and sheriff's office easier in their
fight against prostitution and lewd conduct. We
are satisfied that the ordinance is a regulation
of the criminal as·pects of sexual conduct. at 683-684.
This Court has decided many cases involving city ordinances
which deal-with areas in which the state has extensively legislated.

Almost without exception, such efforts by cities have

been struck down as in conflict with state statutes.

The

State of Utah, in Title 76 1 Chapter 10 of the Utah Code Annotated,
has spent 60 pages detailing those acts which are "offenses,
against public health, safety, welfare, and morals."

Included

in that chapter, are part 12 and part 13, dealing with pornographic materials and prostitution.

In addition, §76-5-401

through 407 treat in detait what are referred to as "sexual.
offenses."

As has already been noted, cities do have limited

power given to them by statute to prohibit and punish prostitution.

What· the city is trying to do in the instant case,

however, is regulate a vastly broader area of sexual conduct.
If the pronouncements of the deputy county attorney, the
sheriff's captain, and previous court decisions to the effect
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that this is sexual regulation can be believed, the act of
massaging a member of the opposite sex has now been made a
separate sex crime.
~efinition

Obviously, that does not come under the

of "sexual activity" found in §76-10-1301 U.C.A.

(1953) as amended, which defines it to mean "intercourse or
any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another person, regardless of the sex of
either participant."

If the city of South Salt Lake is attem1

ing to redefine sexual activity as including massaging member:
of the opposite sex, the provisions of state and local law
are in direct conflict.

The Supreme Court of

the Lancaster case, previously cited,

bas~d

Cal~fornia,

its decision

in
t~t

this particular sexual regulation was invalid on their decisic
that the state had pre-empted the field of regulating sexual
conduct, and that therefore the city was coming into conflict
with the state in making any such regulation:
In In re Lane . . . , this Court, after reviewing
the principles governing the preemption doctrine
and the numerous statutes governing sexual conduct,
concluded that the state had adopted a. general
scheme for the regulation of the criminal aspects
of sexual activity and that the state had occupied
the field to the exclusion of all local regulation.
at 682.
We conclude that the Los Angeles ordinance which
is a regulation of sexual conduct must be held .
invalid because the state has preempted the criminal aspects of sexual activity. at 684.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the earlier Allred decision,
appeared to agree with the California Court, in stating:
The State Statutes dealing with sexual offenses
are comprehensive and all sexual relations except
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those between husband and wife are declared to be
unlawful and are denounc·ed as crimes, as an examination of Chapter 53, ·rritle 76 will disclose . . . .
Section 76-53-8 to 76-53-12 deal with pandering
and prostitution and the incidents related thereto.
Section 76-53-10 specified a wide range of acts
pertaining to the soliciting or securing patronage
or prostitution as well as the procuring of females
for the process of prostitution. at 373.
We are of the opinion that the state by enacting
comprehensive and complete laws pertaining to sexual
offenses has preempted that field. It do~s not
appear that the state intended that municipalities
deal.with these offenses except in those areas pertaining
to prostitution where the legislature has made specific grants of authority to municipalities as set
forth above. at 373.

However, the Defendant contends in the case before
us that the ordinance in question i.s inconsistent
.and in conflict with state laws and therefore invalid
on the grounds that the ordinanc.e attempts to. make
crimes of acts which are not crimes under the state
laws. Assuming this to be true, a careful examination
of the city ordinance, 32-2-1, Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, and the material sections
of the state laws pertaining to sexual offenses, 76-53-8
through 76-53-12, U.C.A. 1953, reveals that both the
ci.ty ordinance and state statutes have the common
purpose of defeating the practice of business of prosti.tution ·or the vice of sexual intercourse for hire
and are closely related in subject matter. The mere
fact that an act is denounced as a crime under the
ordinance which is not denounced as a crime under
the statute would not necessarily render the act
under the ordinance inconsistent with the statute
where as here the ordinance is within the $cope of
the state law dealing with the same rela'ted subject
of sexual offenses and is no way repugnant to, but
-25-
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on the other hand is in harmony with the state
laws. We believe the ordinance is consistent
with the statutes pertaining to sex offense.
at 436.
In the Allred case, a woman was convicted of directing
a police officer to a place and a person, for the purpose of

prostitution.

The Court ruled that this was an act intimately

associated with prostitution and that the city, in aiding the
state in stopping prostitution, could make the one extra step
to make it more difficult for prostitution to flourish.
city is not doing that here.

The

They are, instead, making a new

class of sexual offense, which has only a tenuous relationship
to the offense of prostitution.

They are not attempting to do

something authorized by the Allred case, but are attempting to
do something clearly out of harmony and. inconsistent.with the
state statute, which is therefore invalid, under either Allred
decision.
The decision in the 1968 Allred case appears to have been
cut back in effect almost immediately.

In State vs. Salt Lake

City, 445 P2d 691 (Utah 1968) this Court declared invalid an
ordinance of Salt Lake City licensing private non-profit social
clubs.

The city had simply copied the state licensing require·

ment, changing only enough words to make it apply to city offi·
cers, rather than state officers.

The Court quoted extensively

from Abbott vs. City of Los Angeles, 3 Cal. Reptr. 158, 349
P2d 974 (Cal. 1960) in stating that:
The invalidit¥ ar~ses, not fr~m conflict of language,
but from the inevitable conflict of jurisdiction
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which would result from dual regulations covering
the same ground. Only by such a broad definition
of "conflict" is it possible to confine local
legislation to its proper field of supplementary
regulation. 445 P2d_ at 694.
Further commenting on problems of allowing the city to
regulate the private clubs in the m.anner they were attempting
to do, the Utah bourt said:
Thus the lines of conflict on the instant action
emerge, since the ordinance, as enacted by the city,
is an encroachment upon the state's exclusive right
to determine the qualification of thqse entities who
shall be entitled to operate as state chartered non
profit clubs or associations. There is a conflict
of jurisdiction because the effect of the ordinance
could result in the city's forbidding what the
legislature has expressly licensed, .authorized, or
required. at 6.94.
Thus, if the state has already regulated the area, the
conflict of jurisdictions is sufficient to keep the city from
regula t.ing the same area.·

Here, of course, we have a much

wider area of conflict than was deemed sufficient to hold
the law invalid in State vs·. Salt Lake City.
In Allgood vs. Lars.en, 545 P2d, 530 (Utah 1976) the Defendant was convicted of violation of §32-3-3 of the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City.

That ordinance made the crime of trespass

a class B misdemeanor.

Section 76-6-206(3) of the Utah Code

made the same crime an infraction, for which no jail sentence
could be imposed., The criminal Defendant successfully obtained
a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court,
and that Writ was upheld in this Court.

The Court, in upholding

the Writ, declared:
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The district court ruled "that since the :state
law provides no jail sentence for trespass, which
is classified as 'an infraction,' that the city
cannot impose a greater sentence than that provided by state law, and it is for that reason
that the Court grants the petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus." With this we agree and
affirm the trial court.
Salt Lake City seeks to exceed the public policy
declared by the legislature relating to a new
class of offense. It does not have that power
of amendment. at 532.
Further, the Court quoted from McQuillin; Municipal
Corporations, §17.15, at page 326, in declaring the law in
Utah:
. . . If the ordinance penalty conflicts with that
of the general law of the state covering the same
subject, the ordinance penalty is void. The
charter ordinance penalty cannot exceed that of_ the
state law. at 532.
Justice Crockett, in dissent, stated as follows:
The legislature has specifically granted authority
to the city to prohibit criminal trespass by
§10-8-50, Utah Code Annotated 1953, wherein it
states that cities have the power to:
. . . provide for the punishment of trespass and
such otner petty offenses as tne board of c6mmissioners
or city council may deem proper. at 532.
In other words, the majority of the court ruled that a
city may not decide the punishment of a crime, when that
punishment appears to conflict with the state pronouncement
on the same subject, even though there is a specific grant
of authority for. so setting the penalty.

The state, then,

by making a later pronouncement of public policy, is deemed
to have overruled its earlier pronouncement that cities
-28-
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exercise sp.ecific grants of power.

In this case, the state

has defined the perimeters of what- is and is not illegal
sexual conduct, and any previous grant of power to the
city, is not sufficient to override what the state has pronounced.
In the case of Layton City vs. Speth, 578 P2d 828 (Utah
1978) Defendant was convicted under a city ordinance which
duplicated the language of §58-37-8(2) (2ii) which stated
that it shall be unlawful:
For any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
control 9f any building, room, tenament, vehicle,
boat, aircraft, or other place, knowirig.ly and
intentionally to permit the same to be occupied
by persons unlawfully possessing; using, or
distributing controlled substances therein.
The Court, apparently returning once again to the more
strict construction of the statutes granting legislative
-·

authority to the cities which characterized the earlier
opinion in Salt Lake City vs. Allred, ruled the ordinance
must be set aside, in the following language:
At the time of the alleged offense the statutes
of Utah permitted cities certain powers including
a prohibition against" ... the sale, giving away of
furnishing of intoxicating liquors or narcotics,
or of .tobacco to any person under 21 years of
age; ... ". The statute has since been amended
but the amendment has no bearing on the present
case.
Cities are also empowered by statute to pass all
ordinances, rules, and regulations for carrying
into effect all powers and duties conferred and
"such as are necessary and proper to provide by
the safety and preserve the health, and promote
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good
order, comfort and convenience of the city and
the inhabitants thereof, ... ".
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The ordinance in question is not one which is
necessary for carrying into effect any of the
purposes above mentioned. at 829.
While, then, the second Allred decision appeared to give
cities a grant of authority to protect safety, health, morals,
peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the city,
which grant of authority was in addition to the many specified
grants, the Layton. City vs. Speth decision, appears to make
that position untenable.

In fact, in that decision, the

Court very clearly made a rather strict interpretation of
what the city can and cannot do in the area of drugs.

The

Court clarified its view of city powers even further, in
stating:
By the statute it is clear that the only authority
given to the city was to prohibit anyone from
selling, giving away, or furnishing mariju~na to
a person under twenty-one years of age. Mr. Speth
is not charged with doing any of those unlawful
acts; and that part of the ordinance which attempts
to make it unlawful for a owner of an automobile,
knowingly and intentionally, to permit persons to
occupy it who possess, use, or distribute marijuana
must be held to be beyond the power of the city to
enact. The ordinance is, therefore, invalid. at 829.
Although the Court then went on to determine that there
was a conflict in penalties, in that a second offense under
the state statute was treated more harshly than a second
offense under the city ordinance, it is clear that the Court
did not make its decision based on the difference of penalties.
The Court made its decision based on the fundamental decision
that the city did not have a wide range of additional police
powers not specifically granted in Title 10 Chapter 8 of the
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Utah Code.

Obviously the city could, and probably did,

argue that such an ordinance was protective of the publtc
health, safety, and morals.

In fact, assuming that the

state was correct in labeling marijuana a dangerous drug
in the first place, such an ordinance on the part of the
city may well have exercised the protective functions that
the city stated as justification.

Nevertheless, the ordi-

nance was both beyond the power of the city to enact, lacking
a specific grant of authority, and was in conflict with
state regulations in the area .. The ordinance at issue in
the instant

c~se

is also both beyond the power of the city

to enact and in direct conflict with the state statutes
defining public policy on the issues of sex offenses.
Before leaving this subject, a brief reference should
be made to §76-10-1201 through 1226, U.C.A. (1953) as amended,
in which the State .of Utah takes a strong stand against public
displays of riudity and other sexual activities.

In this

series of statutes, the state legislature recognized that it
w~s ~nacting

a comprehensive scheme of regulation regarding

pornography and similar offenses.

It therefore, in §76-10-1210

specifically gave authority to the cities to further regulate
the.materials complained of.

It does not appear the legisla-

ture felt that the cities would have such authority without the
specific delegation of that statute, dispite the language
of §10-8-84 seemingly giving the cities broad authority to
improve the public morals. The legislature wanted it clear that
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cities have the right especially to protect minors against
materials which might otherwise be too readily available for
them.

It was the intent of the legislature, as specifically

stated in §76-10-1210(3) "to give the broadest meaning permis 8 .
able under the federal and state constitutions to words
'offends public decency' in §76-10-803."

Section 76-10-803

defines a "public nuisance" but note that such broad language
is confined to the area of pornography, pkohibited by the abou
cited statutes.

No such broad declaration on the part of the

legislature has been enacted to give cities like authority
in the area at issu·e here.

That can only be due to a decision

on the part of the legislature that the conduct they have
proscribed was the proper proscription to be applied to
consentual adult activity in a non-public place.

POINT.IV
SECTION 3B-8-5(1) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH SALT
LAKE DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 2 AND 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

STAT

OF UTAH.
Since the similar ordinance of Salt Lake County, containing
identical language to this contested section is also here on
appeal and since the brief of appellants in that matter exhaust·
ivly treats the subject, the appellants here will be concise.

I

I

In doing so, however, we do not downplay the importance of these:
legal arguments, and ask the Justices of this Court to carefullY
-32-
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read the arguments of Counsel in the companion case, so as to
fully consider the issues presented.

Ordinances similar to the

ones at issue here have been 'litigated extensively in the last
ten years.

Attacks on such ordinances on federal constitutional

grounds have concentrated on the following points:

(1) that the

opposite sex massage prohibition creates a sex based classification without rational basis or compelling in.terest therefore, contrary to the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment; (2) that the opposite sex massage prohibition infringes
on the fundamental right to . pursue a legitimate occupation,
contrary to the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment;
(3) that the opposite sex

mass~ge

irrebutable presumption that

prohibition creates an

p~rsons

mas·saging persons of the

opposite sex will engage in illicit sexual activity, an
irrational presumption which denies due process of law contrary
to the.14th Amendment; and (4) that t;:he opposite sex massage
prohibition is overbroad in its effect when there are. less
restrictive means of achieving the same obiective (prohibition
of prostitution). thus rendering the ordinance void as a denial
of due process, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
For many years the landmark case on the constitutional
issues brought up by this type of ordinance was Ex. parte Maki,
113 P2d 64 (Calif. 1943) stating that the fundamental rights
of the -massage parlor owners and workers were not abridged by
such ordinance.

The effect of that decision was overruled in

Lancaster vs. Municipal Court· for the Beverly Hills Judicial
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District of Los Angeles County, a 1972 California Supreme Court
decision previously cited in this brief, which found such ordina
invalid as intruding into areas preempted by state legislation.
Since the

~aki

decision, a number of other courts have ruled

on the same points.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in

Smith vs. Kea tor, 206 S. E. 2d 203 (N. C. 197 4) ; the Supreme Court
of Virginia, in Kisley vs. City of Falls Church, 187 S.E.2d 168
(Va. 1972); and a New Jersey intermediate appeals court, in an
unreported decision of January 29, 1974, upheld such ordinances.
Most courts did not.

See J. S. K. Enterprises, Inc. vs. City of

Lacey, 4 93 P 2d 1015 (Wash. app. 197 2) , Corey vs. City of Dallas
3 52 F. Supp. 977 (N. D. Texas 197 2) , Cianciolo vs. Members of

1

Cit~

Council, Knoxville, Tenn., 376 F.Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1974),
Valley Health Systems, Inc. vs. City of Racine, 369 F.Supp. 97
(E.D. Wis. 1973).

The United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in deciding the case of
Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. vs. Rizzo, 387 F.Supp. 690
(E.D. Pa. 1974) at page 695, found the trend towards finding
such ordinances in violation of the 14th Amendment, overwhelming.
That Court, of course, also found the ordinance of the City
of Philadelphia invalid.

A development in the United States

Supreme Court, in 197 5, seemed to put a halt to such decisions.
That Court ruled, in Hicks vs. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S .Ct.
2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 233 (1975) that a dismissal in that Court for
want of a substantial federal question was to be treated as
dispositive of the merits of the issues.

In other words
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'

such

a dismissal after contentions that an ordinance violated the
14th Amendment, was in effect, an indication that such an ordinance did not violate the 14th Amendment.

That was important to

this line of cases in that the three cases previously cited as
upholding

similar ord.inances had all beE7n appealed to the

United States Supreme Court, and all three had been so dismissed.

The Colorado Springs Amusements case, pre-yiously

cited, was_ then overruled by the Third Circuit C.oµrt of Appeals,
based on the Hicks vs. Miranda

.decision~

See Col6rado Springs

Amusements Ltd. vs. Rizzo, 524 F.2d 571 (3rd Cir. 1975).

That

decision was followed by similar C'iircuit .Court dec:Ds.ions. in
Hogge vs. Johnson, 526. F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1975) and

'.~omlinson

vs. Mayor and-Aldermen, 543 F2d 570 (5th Cir. 1976).

While

it appears that the United.States Supreme Court has, to this
time, been-unwilling to rule that an ordinance such as the one
contested here ·is in violation ,of the United States Constitution, and other federal law relied on in part in the Cianciolo
and Corey cases, that Court has certainly not specifically
denied such.relief.

The Hicks case came after all three appeals

to the Supreme Court had been made,.and the effect of the
Hicks case has then been used retroactively, to achieve the
result in the cited Circuit Court cases.
There has been some discussion by legal
effect that the Supreme

Co~rt

schola~s

to the

wishes to decide no more sexual

discrimination cases until a final determination is made on
the passage of the equal rights amendment.
..

Utah has its own
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version of the equal rights amendment, in Article IV, Section
1, of the Constitution of Utah, which states, in. part " . . .
both male and female citizens of this state shall enjoy equally
all civil, political and religious rights and privileges."
That provision of the Utah Constitution certainly appears to
give far more protection against irrational sexual classification than does the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

Utah of course, has its own Equal Protection and Due

Process requirements, found in Article I, sections 2 and 7.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, in the one major development to have occurred in this area of law since the above
cited cases, decided the case of City and
vs. Nielson, 572 P2d 484, in 1977.

Count~

of Denver

That Court used its own

state constitution to find the ordinance at issue in that case
unconstitutional.

The Court stated:

Regardless of the Third Circuit Court's decisions
in Colorado S rin s Amusements Ltd. vs. Rizzo, Supra,
states may interpret t eir own constitutiona
provisions to afford greater protection than
the Supreme Court of the United States as recognized in its interpretation of the Federal
counterparts to state constitutions. at 485.
The Denver ordinance is not a reasonable regulation. It creates an unreasonable, arbitrary, and
unconstitutional conclusive presumption, in violation of Article II, Section 25 of the Colorado
Constitution. The ordinance is unduly oppressive
to legitimate massage practitioners and goes
beyond the means reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate objective of preventing
illicit sexual behavior .. Alternative, constitutionally permissable methods of curtailing sexually
illicit behavior are available to legislative
bodies. at 486.
-36-
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The Utah Supreme Court has plenty of Constitutional
grounds in its own Constitution, including the additional
prohibition against sexual discrimination, on which to rule
this ordinance unconstitutional.

Recourse, however, does

not even need to be made to the constitution, but can be
made simply on statutory and

decisi~nal groun~s,

as laid

out in detail in previous points of this brief.
POINT V
SECTION 3B-8-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS IN
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH ANTI DISCRIMINATION ACT AND UTAH
CIVIL RIGHT STATUTES.
Once again, this contention is treated exhaustively in
the brief of Plaintiff-Appellants in the companion case of
Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County Commission.

Plaintiffs

here do not have much to add to that exhaustive treatment,
and simply state here that this ordinance violates §34-35-6
U.C.A. (1953) as amended by illegally forcing massage establishments to hire only male masseurs, as it has been agreed
that clientele is almost exclusively male.

Plaintiffs right

now employ both male and female masseurs, and do not discriminate on the basis of sex in either hiring or providing
services.
POINT VI
SECTION 3B-8-5(3) IS INVALID AS BEING BOTH BEYOND THE
DELEGATED POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND IN DIRECT
CONFLICT WITH STATE STA1'UTES.
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In addition to the provisions of the South Salt Lake
massage ordinance relating to opposite sex massages, there
is a provision creating yet another sex crime, that of
"touch [ing]

or offer [ing] to touch or massage the gen-

italia of customers."

The criminal penalty for a violation

of this section is a possible six months in the Salt Lake
County Jail and/or $299.00 fine.

This section does not

directly affect the right of Plaintiffs to continue an
existing business, but it affects currently pending criminal
charges.

The Society of Licensed Masseurs, a partnership

which is a party to this action through its managing partner,
Rusty Hanna, is a group of masseurs employed at the King's
Palace.

Society members Debbie Hanna, Julie Hanna, Pamela

Cabey, Susan Rosvall and Shauna Bauer have been charged with
violations of this ordinance, and the criminal proceedings
are pending, as of the time this brief is written.

Plaintiffs

have previously made the arguments in this brief, that the act
of massaging a member of the opposite sex has been designated
po~

as a new sex crime, and that the city has both exceeded its
and come into conflict with general state laws, in so doing.
section of the ordinance under discussion here suffers from
the same defects, but the conflicts with the state law are
more clear.

eve~

The public policy of the State of Utah regarding

illegal sexual activity is clearly defined in §76-10-1301
U.C.A. (1953) as amended.

et~

§76-10-1301 defines "sexual activitl

and "house of prostitution" as follows:
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(1) "Sexual Activity" means intercourse or any
sexual act involving the genitals of one person
and the mouth or anus of another person, regardless
of the sex of either particpant.
(2)
"House of Prostitution" means a place where
prostitution or promotion of prostitution is
regularly carried on by one or more persons
under the control, management, or supervision
of another.

§76-10-1302 U.C.A. (1953) as amended then goes on
to prohibit prostitution in the following words:
(1)

(2)

A person is guilty of prosti,tution when:
(a)

He engages or offers or agrees to engage
in any sexual activity with another person
.for a fee; or

(b)

Is an inmate of a "house of prostitution;
or

(c)

Loiters in or within view of any public
place for the purpose of bein hired
to engage in sexual activity.

Prostitution isa class B misdemeanor, provided that
any person who is twice convicted under this section
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

It could easily be argued,. under the doctrines set forth
in, Layton City v·s. Speth, that any regulation of pr'ostitution whatsoever on a local level is now void, as being
in conflict with the state law.

The penalty phase, seen as

sufficient conflict in both the L'a'yton· Gity 'vs'.' Speth and
Allgood vs·.· LaYsen cases, must be in

di~pute,

as cities have

no power to pass ordinances punishable on a second offense,
as a class "A" misdemeanor.

While that issue is not directly

in front of the Court, a very

simila~

issue is.

Salt Lake

County has enacted section §16-23-4 of their revised
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ordinances, defining and punishing prostitution.

The act

reads as follows:

§16-23-4.
(1)

(2)

Prostitution.

Any female person who performs, solicits,
offers or agrees to perform any of the
following acts for money or other consideration commits an act of prostitution:
(a)

Any act of sexual intercourse; or

(b)

Any act of deviate sexual conduct.

Deviate sexual conduct for the purpose of this
section means:
(a)

Any act of sexual, ratification involving
the sex organs of one person and the mouth
or anus of another.

(b)

(3)

A person convicted of prostitution shall be fined
not to exceed $299.00 or imprisoned in the County
Jail not to exceed six months, or both. (Emphasis
added).

Salt Lake County, then, has passed an ordinance in direct

1

conflict with the prostitution statute of the State of Utah. In
all areas of the state outside of Salt Lake County, prostitution
means one thing, and in Salt Lake County, it means far more.
Even the most tortured reading of the second Al1r'ed decision
does not give the county authority for doing this.

The fact that

the ordinance was passed long before the new criminal code
defining what prostitution is in the State of Utah, would seem
to read a simple over-ruling of the county by the state.
back to the second

Allr~d

Going

decision, the majority of the Court,
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upon re-hearing, stated:
There is nothing in the state statutes regulating
sexual offenses that evidences any express or implied
intent to preclude local governments from also
attempting to prohibit and suppress the difficult
problem of the sex offender. Therefore, it is our
opinion that the city is not precluded in enacting
the ordinance in question unless it is inconsistent
or in conflict with the states statutes dealing with
sex offenses. At 436.
A redefining of prostitution to include matters that
the state decided were not prostitution, is both inconsistent
and in conflict with the state statutes.

The county clearly

has no authority to pass this ordinance.
The 'county, in passing their version of §3B-8-5 (3) (their
number 15-18-5(3)) were restating their obviously invalid view
of prostitution.

Whereas some might contend that the opposite

sex provisions of the new ordinance'were designed to "prohibit
and suppress the difficult problem of the sex offender" as
defined ·by the state, §5(3) of the county of city massage
ordinances is directly in conflict with the state law.

It is

not designed to suppress something the state has declared to be
prostitution.

It is either a direct frontal assault on the state

statute, or, in the alternative, simply an anachronism from the
time before the state passed its comprehensive Act on the subject,
in 1973.

While the state, in addition to its prostitution laws,

prohibited certain unnatural sex acts, ';1nder the heading of"Sodomy"

(§76-5-403) and also prohibited adultry (§76-7-103,' and fornication
(§76-7-104) the decision was clearly made that the conduct defined

-41-
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as prostitution and deviate sexual conduct by the county,
was not a crime.

The county prostitution ordinance,

and this portion of the county massage ordinance, are not
intended to attack "the difficult problem of the sex offender''
because, in fact, a person engaging in the conduct prohibited
by the ordinance section at issue here is· nbt

a sex offender.

The city, in adopting the county ordinance regarding the toi

of members of the opposite sex, adopted the county's invalid
decision as to what is and is not prostitution.

The city,

however, has even a further problem, which the county does not
have.

The city has now clearly denied masseurs the Equal Protec

of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment the United
States Constitution, and Article I, §2 of the constitution of
the State of Utah.

There is no law in the city of south Salt

Lake, or any other community, outside of the unicorporated area
of Salt Lake county, that I can find, which makes it a crime for
two people' married or unmarried, for a fee or not for a fee, to
touch each other wherever they please, as long as both consent,
it is not done in a place open to

publi~

view, and no sexual

contact as defined in state statute, results therefrom.

Therefo

if a person is licensed as a masseur, he is subject to imprison·
ment for the same kind of conduct which any other person may
engage in with impunity.

This then renders §3B-8-5(3) of the

revised ordinances of South Salt Lake null and void as in direct
conflict with the constitutions of the State of Utah and the
United States.
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·

lt is appropriate here to refer to the case of rn·

~

Lane,

372 P2d.897 (Calif 1962) in which the Court stated as follows:
Defendant was convicted of the crime of "resorting,"
after a court trial in the Municipal Court for the
Los Angeles Judicial District on two charges of
violating §51.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code,
which provides: "No person shall resort to any
off ice building or to any room used or occupied
in connection with, or under the same management
and any cafe, restaurant, soft drink parlor, liquor
establishment, or similar businesses, or to any
public park or to any of the buildings therein or
to any vacant lot, room rooming house, lodging
house, residence, apartment house, hotel, house
trailer, street or sidewalk for the purpose of
having sexual intercourse with a person to whom
he or she is not married, or for the purpose of
performing or participating in any lewd act with
any such person. At 898.
The court, on page 899 of the decision lists numerous
acts of sexual intercourse which_have been made illegal by the
state, and then goes on to list lewd acts in public places,
crimes against children, indecent exposure, obscene exhibitions
and acts against public decency as being outlawed by the state
of California.

Defendant was accused of going from her own

living room to her own bedroom "for the purpose of having
sexual interc;:ourse with a male to whom she was not married."
(At 898)

The court stated:

Although living in a state of cohabitation and
adultery is prohibited, neither simple fornication
o·r adultery alone nor living in a state of cohabitation
and fornication has been made a crime in this atate.
(citations omitted.)
Accordingly, a city ordinance attempting to make
sexual intercourse between persons not married to
each other criminal is in conflict with the state
law and is void. At 900.
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In this state of course, sexual intercourse between
unmarried persons has been made a crime, although rarely
enforced.

The mere touching without sexual contact, has not

been made a crime.

The city may not add numerous new

sex crimes to what the state legislature has declared is the
public policy of this state.
POINT VII
§3B-8-5(3) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH SALT LAKE
IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
It is settled rule of law that a statute written so
vaguely that it does not set out a clear standard df the
prohibited, is void as a denial of due process of law.

beh~im

That

standard was set out, among other places, in Chainplln Refining

Co

vs. Corporation Gom,286 US 210, 76 L Ed. 1062, 52 S.Ct. 559 (193l
where the United States Supreme Court said:
In light of our decisions it appears upon a mere
inspection that these general words and phrases are ~.o
vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their
violation constitutes a denial of Due Process of law.
It is not the penalty itself that is invalid, but the
exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that is
so vague and indefinite as to be really no rule or
standard at all. (Citations omitted.) 52 S.ct.
In the Jensen vs. Salt Lake County case, previously cited,
the court ruled an earlier version of the Salt Lake County
massage ordinance void for vagueness, in the following
language:
The trial court was of the opinion that the language
of the ordinance was so vague and uncertain as to
render it invalid. We conclude that that determination
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by the trial court was correct. A person who
might wish to enter the field covered by the ordinance
would be unable to determine from its wording.what
qualifications or skill would be necessary to
qualify for a license. It is noted that the ordinance
uses the term "massage therapist" but nowhere is that
term defined. At 4.
At first glance, the ordinance at issue here seems to be
deceptiv?lY: simple and clear.

Litigation undertaken under

this ordinance in the Justice Court for the city of South
Salt Lake, indicates that the ordinance is not quite so clear.
In a juzy trial held in that court on February 25, "1980, a
masseur working at the King's Palace was charged with the crime
of:
"Unlawful massage on November 25, 1979 at or about 60
West, 3300 South, King's Palace Health Studio at .or
about 8:15 P.M~ in violation of city ordinance Title 3B,
chapter 8, §3B-8-5(3), in :that said Defendant, acting
as a masseur, did offer to touch or massage the
genitalia of a customer, t.o wit: special South Salt
Lake officer Cliff Dye. (Complaint No. 79-6559, ·
Justice Court of South Salt Lake, in the matter of
City of South S'a1t L'ake vs. St:t's·an· Ma·e· Ro'sVa11).
Defendant, through counsel", submitted the following Jury
instruction defining the crime charged:
The Defendant in this matter is charged with violation of
§3B-8-5 (3) of the ordinances of South Salt Lake which
states "It shall be unlawful for a masseur to touch
or offer to touch or massage the genitalia of customers."
The ordinance is designed 'to prohibit· a commercial sexual
business'. In order to confict the Defendant, you must
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that she offered to
massage the genitals of the complaining witness· 'fo'r a
· ·fee, and the offer was immediate in nature in that she
wa:8" to perform the act ·at the time ·Bind p1·a·ce· the agre·ement
was m·a'de.
·
The court, having heard objections from the c~ty of South
Salt Lake on several phases.of this instruction, gave the instructio
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-45-

to the jury, minus the underlined portions.

The Court then, in

effect, ruled that the ordinance did not require the act to be a
conunercial act for a fee, ·and that the offer to touch need not
be confined to the massage establishment.

Under the interpretati

of the South Salt Lake City Justice Court, a masseur who accepts,
date from a customer, even if she may have known him before, and

I

the date offer contains any language relating to possible physic,

affection, may have violated the law.

That interpretation doesn

sound reasonable, but it appears to have been made by a court
charged with interpreting that ordinance.
In a subsequent action in the same court involving another
masseur, where the charging part of the complaint was substantial
the same, counsel submitted the following proposed instruction:
You a:J;e instructed that the word "offer" according to
Black's Law Dictionary, means "To present for acceptance or rejection."
The Defendant in this matter is charged with offering
to touch the genitalia of a customer. You may find
the Defendant guilty of that act, if you believe that
she has offered, according to this definition. If,
however, the police officer made the offer, and no
actual touching took place, the Defendant is not
guilty.
The Court rejected this instruction outright, after objectio
by the city, in the apparent assumption that the word "offer"
could be interpreted, as the city contended, to include the
acceptance of someone else's offer.

Again, this appears to be a

simple misinterpretation of what the ordinance says, but a court
of competent jurisdiction has so interpreted it, thus leading

-46-
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to the inescapable co!lclusion that the.ordinance is so vague as
to lend itself to such tortured interpretations.
In the case of

Stat~

vs. PeterSbn, 560 P2d. 1387 (Utah 1973)

the Defendant.was charged with Forceable Sexual Abuse, in that
he touched "the genitals of another with the intent to arouse
his own sexual desire, without the consent of the other," in
violation of §76-5-404 U.C.A. (1953) as amended.

The Court

ruled at that time that the Defendant had touched the genitals
o_f the victim, despite the uncontroverted evidence that the contract was made through a layer of clothing.

(See page 1390-1391).

While in a prosecution for a sexually motivated assault, such a
tight prohibition may have merit, such interpretation of the
word "touch" in construing. this.ordinance would allow a masseur
to be convicted for a mere brushing passed the genitals of a
customer, even though the customer may be fully covered with a
towel, as is the practice at the King's Palace.

Unlike the

obviously invalid prostitution ordinance of Salt Lake County,
this ord'inance do·es not require ·an.v ·intent thus allowing lower
courts a
under it.

wid~

latitude as to what kind of conduct can be proscribed

Reading the ordinance so as to not require any kind of

sexual intent for a conviction, certainly renders the ordinance
so vague and over-broad as to constitute a denial of D-q.e Process
of Law.
POINT VIII
SECTIONS 3B-8-3, 4, 7 AND 8 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF
THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE ARE'INVALID BECAUSE THEY ARE
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UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, BEYOND THE DELEGATED POWERS GIVEN
TO MUNICIPALITIES BY THE STATE OF UTAH AND ARE IN CONFLICT
WITH UTAH STATUTES.
While the two ordinance sections discussed at length previously are the most onerous portions of this ordinance, other
sections are also invalid.

Section 3B-8-3 states requirements

for issuing licenses to both a massage establishment and a
masseur working in such an establishment.

While §10-8-39 and

10-3-40 appear to give cities the power to license a massage
establishment, as any other business, nowhere is the power given
to license those who work' in the massage establishments.

It

is established legal doctrine that a state statute conferring
licensing power on a city is to be strictly construed and any
doubt resolved against the city.
255 P. 329 (Ariz. 1924).

See McCarthy vs·. Ci'ty of Tucson1

Since it nowhere appears that the city

has specific authority to license masseurs employed in a massage
establishment, this portion of the ordinance should fail completel
Even assuming that the city does have this licensing power, this
section of the ordinance appears to be so vague as to come under
the proscription previously cited in the· Jensen case.

A careful

reading of the licensing portion indicates only that a masseur
must make an application to the city council through the city
recorder, must provide certain information specifically asked
for, and must be 21 years of age.

It is also established doctrine

that licensing ordinances or statutes are to be strictly construed
when they deal with the right of someone to pursue his chosen
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occupation.

See Roberts vs. State Bd. of Etnba1tn·e·r·s an'd Fuheral

Directors, 434 P2d 61 (N.M. 1967).

A strict construction of that

ordinance could render it constitutional,,by indica_ting that the
c.ity has no power to refuse licensing to anyone who has filled
those simple requirements.

The city, in several cases to date

however, has. assumed more power.
that it has t;:he_

~ow~r

The city council has assumed

to de_cide the fitness of a person, depend-

ing on the information received pursuant to the ordinance.

Such

a wide discretion in the city council, the licensing authority,
~

renders the licensing ordinance invalid for failure to state
comprehensible ·standards, also pursuant to the· Jen·sen case.
The city council then has the power to be as arbitrary ·and
capricious as it wishes with no standards on which its performance is to be judged.
In addition, the requiremen.t that a masseur be at least
21 years of age is in direct conflict with Utah State Law which,
iri §15-2-1 (1953) as amended, states in the relevant part,
"the period of minority extends in males and females. to the age
of 18 years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage."
Wh,ile certain rights of adults are specifically withheld until
19 or 21 (e.g .. rights to smoke and drink) by the state, no
municipality has the right to decide under what circumstances
a person should be treated as an adult,· and what
he may not.

That area is clearly preempted by the

"
Therefore', §3B-8-3, of the massage
ordinance,

assumptions

cir~umstances

stat~.

becaus~

of authority and conflicts with state

of various

l~w,

is
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invalid in its entirety.
Section 3B-8-4 of the Revised Ordinances of The City of
South Salt Lake gives the unbridled power to the City-County
Board of Health to decide when the premises of a massage establishment are "sanitary enough" to conduct 'business.

For the

reasons enunciated above, the statute is invalidly vague as it
does not state comprehensible standards, and allows complete
arbitrary and capricious descretion to a regulating authority.
Sections 3B-8-7 and 8 of the Revised Ordinances of South
Salt Lake, ·the civil and criminal penalties sections, are invalid
as they allow a massage establishment owner to lose his license
or be convicted of a crime due to not what he has done, but what
his employees have done.

Since by the very nature of the busi-

ness, massages are given out of the view of the public on a
"one on one" basis, a ·massage establishment owner cannot ·have
full control over what goes on between a masseur and a customer.
All he can do is his best to check on them and educate them
as to what is allowed and what is not allowed.
this , he has done his duty under the law.

If he has done

This ordinance section

is in conflict with §76-4-201 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, in that
it defines a new conspiracy-type offense.

The law is plain on

what conspiracy is, as stated in the cited statute:
. . . a person is guilty of conspiracy when he,
intending that conduct constituting a crime be
performed, agrees with one or more persons to
engage in or cause the performance of such
conduct and anyone of them commits an overt
act in pursuance of the conspiracy . . . .
-50-
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If .the ordinance allowed conviction or revocation of license
only after conspiracy

~as

proven, it might well be valid.

The

fact that it now permits punishment for no crime at all, renders
it clearly invalid as another example of the "bills of pain and
penalty" prohibited by Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.

POINT IX
SECTION 3B-8-5(2) IS AN INVAL_ID ATTEMPT BY THE CITY TO
REGULATE LIQUOR, AN AREA OF LAW PREEMPTED BY THE STATE.
In the companion case of Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County
Commission, the memorandum filed by the County Commission in
attempting to get summary judgment in the lower court, stated,
in point VI, page 23,
The Defendants concede that §15-18-5(2)
to limit the places where liquor can be
sold and that it is invalid because the
empted the, area governing the siting of
stores.

purports
·stored and
state preliquor

Plaintiffs allege in paragr~ph 8 of their Complaint
that §15-18-5(2) of the ordinance is invalid becau~e
Salt Lake· County does not have the authority to
regulate in the area of liquor control. Section
15-18-5(2) of the ordinance provides "It shall be
unlawful to serve, to store~ or allow to be served,
or allow to be consumed, any alcoholic beverages
on the licensed premises of a massage establishment."
The State of Utah does have general authority over
the sale and storage of liquor and the language of·
§15-18-5(2) could be construed to be in conflict
with the province of the state.
The Defendants cannot in good conscience oppo'se an
order determining §15-18-5(2) to be invalid as it
is presently enacted.
The lower court did not respond to the County's concession that this section of the ordinance is

inv~lid.

They have,
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however, so conceded and the ordinance should be struck down
based on that.

Since the city has copied their ordinance

word for word from the county, it can only be assumed that
they will also concede

that point, and this ordinance section

should be declared invalid.

POINT X
THE ENTIRE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCE, SECTIONS
3B-8-1 THROUGH 3B-8-10, SHOULD BE DECLARED INVALID, BECAUSE
THE PROVISIONS ARE INTERRELATED.
It is the general practice of legislative bodies in this
country to include a severability clause in any multi facited
piece of legislation, to assure that the valid provisions will
remain in effect, if invalid portions are found by courts, and
stricken.

It is established law, however, that a piece of

legislation in which major interrelated sections are invalid,
can and should be stricken in its entirety.

This was clearly

stated in the case of State· vs.· S'alt Lake Clty, previously
cited, where this Court stated:
Finally we are confronted with the issue of the
effect of the severability clause contained in
§20-29-25 of the ordinance. This Court has previously held that even where a savings clause
existed, where the provisions of the statute are
interrelated, it is not within the scope of this
court's function to select the valid portions of
the act and conjecture that they should stand
independently of the portions which are invalid.
At 696.
.
Almost the entire working sections of this ordinance are
clearly invalid for one reason, or many.

Therefore, this ordinanc
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in its entirety should be declared invalid and the City of South
Salt Lake should be told to write an ordinance which permissibly regulates, but does not invalidly restrict or surpress the
legitimate business of giving massages.
CONCLUSION
The order of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing
Plaintiff's Complaint should be reversed, and the matter remanded
to the Third Judicial District Court with instructions to enter
judgment for Plaintiffs declaring §3B-8-l through 3B-8-10 of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake void and of
no effect.

In ·the alternative, this action should be remanded

to the Third Judicial District for proper evidence taking, during
which time the Third Judicial District Court should be ordered
to take appropriate steps to prevent Defendants from enforcing
the ordinance.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this·

;l.·V~ay

of March, 1980.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed 2 true and.correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to Clint
Balmforth, Attorney for Defendants, 2500 South State Street,
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